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Abstract 
 
The study investigates how openness influences information and communication technology 
(ICT) penetration for improved government quality in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 
2000-2012. Openness is measured in terms of trade and financial globalisation whereas ICT is 
proxied with mobile phone and internet penetration rates. Ten bundled and unbundled 
governance indicators are used. The empirical evidence is based on Generalised Method of 
Moments with forward orthogonal deviations. The main findings are: First, financial 
openness has an edge over trade openness when combined with ICT to affect both economic 
and institutional governance. Second, mobile phones have an edge over internet penetration in 
complementing (i) trade openness for economic governance and (ii) financial openness for 
institutional governance. Third, net effects on political governance are consistently negative.  
Taken together, in the short-run, openness-driven ICT policies are more rewarding in terms of 
economic and institutional governance than political governance. Fourth, catch-up in 
governance is facilitated by the interaction between openness and ICT. Contributions of these 
findings to literature are discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
Information technology has been documented to enhance: living standards (Chavula, 
2013); economic growth (Levendis & Lee, 2013; Qureshi, 2013a); welfare externalities 
(Carmody, 2013; Qureshi, 2013bc); life for all (Kivuneki et al., 2011; Ponelis & Holmner, 
2013ab); banking sector development (Kamel, 2005) and sustainable growth (Byrne, 2011) in 
developing countries. While information technology has been established to bring about these 
socio-economic and human development rewards, very little is known about the interaction 
between information technology and macroeconomic variables for institutional outcomes.  
Investigating the role of openness in the effect of information communication 
technology (ICT) on governance in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is motivated by four 
contemporary strands of the literature, notably, the: (i) growth potential of ICT and 
recommendations for more scholarly research on the effect of ICT; (ii) ineluctability of 
openness in 21st century development1; (iii) role of institutions in fighting Africa’s extreme 
poverty tragedy and (iv) gaps in the literature on ICT and governance.  
First, compared to frontier markets in Asia and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations that are currently experiencing some degree 
of stabilisation in the growth of ICT, there is a growth potential in peripheral markets in 
Africa (Asongu, 2017a; Penard et al., 2012). Penard et al. (2012) reported that the mobile 
phone and internet penetration rates in Africa were respectively 41 percent and 9.6 percent in 
2010. While, the potential for ICT penetration on the continent represents development 
opportunities, there have been concerns in scholarly circles not to consider ICT as a silver 
bullet for economic development (Asongu & De Moor, 2015; Mpogole et al., 2008, p. 71).  
Second, openness is essential for the prosperity of nations in the era of globalisation. 
In essence, there is consensus in the literature that integration into the global economy is 
indispensable for 21st century development (Oluwatobi et al., 2015; Tchamyou, 2015). 
According to this strand of literature, Africa is lagging behind in the drive towards knowledge 
economy (KE) which is crucial for contemporary development (Anyanwu, 2012; Asongu, 
2017b). The narrative maintains that the course of global development is being charted by 
North America and Europe because they are frontier nations that have mastered the dynamics 
of KE. While the KE pattern of Japan has set the course for the newly industrialised 
economies of Asia, Malaysia and China, Latin American nations have been responding with 
policy initiatives that articulate their growing pursuit for KE. This starkly contrasts with KE 
                                                          
1
 Openness may be used interchangeably with globalisation throughout the paper.  
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trends in Africa that have been dropping compared to other regions of the world (see, 
Anyanwu, 2012).  
Third, in the post-2015 sustainable development agenda, institutions are crucial in the 
fight against SSA’s extreme poverty tragedy (Kuada, 2015). The sub-region’s poverty tragedy 
has been recently emphasised by an April 2015 World Bank report on the attainment of 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) extreme poverty target which has revealed that 
extreme poverty has been decreasing in all regions of the world with the exception of SSA 
(World Bank, 2015)2. The evidence that 45 percent of countries in the sub-region are off-track 
from achieving the MDG extreme poverty target greatly contrasts with suggestion that it has 
been enjoying over two decades of growth resurgence that started in the mid-1990s (see Fosu, 
2015, p. 44). This has motivated a recent stream of literature devoted to understanding 
Africa’s immiserizing growth, notably: (i) Kuada’s (2015) proposition of a ‘soft economics 
paradigm’ based on human capabilities development and (ii) Fosu’s (2015bc) inquiry into 
whether Africa’s growth resurgence is a myth or a reality with assessments of 
interconnections between institutions and growth in Africa’s development. Moreover, the 
quality of institutions has been established to be strongly linked to inclusive growth, through: 
strengthening of social change foundations (Efobi, 2015) and improvement of living standards 
by means of better resource allocation (Fonchingong, 2014; Anyanwu & Erhijakpor, 2014; 
Fosu, 2013ab).  
Fourth, despite the established roles of institutional quality (Fosu, 2015bc) and ICT 
(Asongu, 2015) in inclusive development, the literature on development outcomes has not 
given the link between ICT and institutions the research attention it deserves. Accordingly, as 
far as we are aware, only four lines of inquiry have assessed the role of ICT on governance in 
Africa, namely: Porter al. (2016); Gagliardone (2015); Mathias (2012) and Snow (2009).  
Snow establishes a negative relationship between corruption and ICT while Mathias 
documents the evolving role of connectivity in boosting accountability on the continent. 
Gargliardone investigates the relationship between mobile-radio interactions and government 
quality to establish that such interactions can substantially boost measures taken by the 
                                                          
2
 It is important to substantiate how the MDG extreme poverty target, the post-2015 sustainable development 
agenda and the poverty Sub-Saharan Africa are related. At least six of the seventeen SDGs are concerned with 
the need to enhance inclusive development, namely: Goal 1(end poverty in all its forms everywhere), Goal 2 
(end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture);  Goal 3 (ensure 
healthy lives and promote well-being for all ages); Goal 4 (ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and 
promote lifelong learning opportunities for all); Goal 8 (promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic 
growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all ) and Goal 10 (reduce inequality within and 
among countries). The interested reader can find more information on the SDGs in Michel (2016).   
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government of Kenya towards prevention and correction. Porter et al. conclude that youth 
usage of the mobile telephony has great potential of being instrumental for enhancing 
practical and policy harmony in a sample of selected African countries, namely:  Ghana, 
Malawi and South Africa.  
The above literature noticeably leaves space for improvement in four key areas. First, 
the discussed literature is restricted to selected dimensions of good governance. For example, 
Snow has exclusively focused on the corruption dimension of good governance. Second, some 
conclusions are characterised with caveats of correlations, such that causality cannot be 
inferred for more robust policy implications. For instance, the findings of Snow are 
statistically fragile because they are interpreted as correlations, not causality. Third, a bulk of 
the literature is oriented towards country-specific inquiries that have limited policy relevance 
in terms of scope (e.g. Porter et al., 2016; Snow, 2009). Fourth, the studies have either not 
directly: (i) involved the use of ICT for good governance (see Gagliardone, 2015) or (ii) 
focused on good governance as a development outcome (see Porter et al., 2016). Moreover, it 
is important to model the ICT-governance nexus by integrating openness as a  policy tool 
in order to internalise the ineluctable phenomenon of globalisation. This modelling approach 
steers clear of techniques in the previous studies that are based on interactions among ICT 
variables, notably Gargliardone (2015) on radio-mobile  interdependencies.  
The present inquiry addresses the aforementioned gaps in the literature by 
investigating the influence of openness in ICT penetration for governance in SSA. More 
specifically, the research question we seek to answer in this inquiry is: how does openness 
complement ICT penetration for better governance in SSA?  
 The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
underpinnings and clarifies the concept of governance. The data and methodology are 
discussed in Section 3. The empirical results, discussion and policy implications are covered 
in Section 4 while Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Clarification of Governance Concepts and Theoretical Highlights  
2.1 Intuition and theory 
 The section discusses the theory behind our topic of research in two main strands, 
namely: (i) the link between ICT and governance and (ii) the link between openness and 
governance. We may deal with each in turn. 
 
2.1.1 Link between ICT and governance  
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 In accordance with Hellstorm (2008), ICT is a vital tool for enhancing governance 
because it can improve transparency, accountability and the free-flow of information between 
several institutions and departments within a government. According to the author, ICT on the 
one hand eases the participation of citizens in the adoption of decisions that influence their 
living standards and on the other, enables the diffusion of information between citizens and 
governments. In summary, better governance is achieved by the means of the ICT enabling 
the convergence of societies for more participation and  information sharing..  
 In the same vein as the above intuition, Snow (2009, p. 337-339) provided a 
theoretical account of the link between ICT and improved governance. It was pointed out that 
the historic dearth of ICT in the African continent provided the elite with a comparative 
advantage. Such preferential endowments in ICT facilities enabled the ruling classes and their 
sponsors to evade accountability and transparency, especially in the management of public 
offices. Under these circumstances, the elite is equally endowed with conducive conditions 
for rent seeking and corruption in the management of public goods and services. According to 
Snow (2009), ICT decentralisation should  lift the barriers of secrecy that have hitherto 
enabled the elite to engage in poor governance practices, by improving oversight and 
accountability with consequent punishment for mismanagement. In summary, the insight 
underlying this concept is consistent with the logic of Hellstorm (2008) in the perspective that 
ICT has considerably mitigated information monopoly by the elite which previously 
facilitated engagement in poor governance and the mismanagement public goods and services 
(Suarez, 2006; Boulianne, 2009; Diamond, 2010; Grossman et al., 2014). 
 It is important to balance the above narrative with another aspect of the literature 
which supports the thesis that ICT could promote political instability and violent actions 
which are likely to ultimately worsen governance standards (Breuer et al., 2012; Pierskalla  & 
Hollenbach, 2013; Weidmann & Shapiro, 2015; Manacorda & Tesei, 2016).  
 
2.1.2 Link between openness and governance  
 Theoretical underpinnings on the nexus between globalisation and governance has 
been documented by an interesting stream of literature, inter alia: Klitgaard (1988); Treisman 
(2000);  Bonaglia et al. (2001); Lalountas et al (2011); Amavilah et al. (2014) and  Asongu 
(2014a). These studies are consistent with the positive influence of globalisation on good 
governance. Lalountas et al and Asongu   established the positive relationship between 
globalisation and corruption-control in developing and African countries respectively. The 
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study of Amavilah et al. is based on the positive correlation between globalisation and 
political stability. Bonaglia et al. built a model in order to show that globalization decreases 
negative governance signals like corruption. The motivation is consistent with Klitgaard 
(1998) which maintained that poor governance thrives on scenarios of power monopoly. 
According to the writers, the incentive to bribery is  less apparent in societies where economic 
activities are undertaken within a framework of perfect competition. In the same vein, poor 
governance decreases when (i) monopolistic government and economic activities are subject 
to stringent accountability and (ii) economic rents are not contingent on the discretionary 
power a few public officials. Hence, Treisman (2000) and Bonaglia et al. (2001) reported 
political openness to traditions of protestant nature lead to improved governance standards. 
This position accords with an earlier view by Klitgaard (1988) that less open countries enjoy 
less political governance.  
 Despite the hypothesised positive impact of openness on the governance structures of 
countries, it is important to balance the narrative because the openness-governance 
relationship is still very much open to different interpretations in the literature. For example, 
while McMillan (2013) confirmed that institutional reforms in Africa have primarily been 
driven by openness, there is a version of the literature which maintains that Openness-driven 
ICT leads to poor governance, because the evolving network of countries and individuals that 
make-up the complex corruption web are difficult to monitor (see Goredema, 2009 ).  
 
2.2 Clarification of governance and ICT-governance concepts 
 
 We organise the argument in  this section in four main categories: (i) eliciting the 
concept of ICT governance, (ii) definitions of governance, (iii) debates surrounding the 
quality of governance indicators and (iv) the motivation for using ten bundled and unbundled 
governance indicators from  the World Bank.  
 Hellstorm (2008) has clarified ICT-governance by maintaining that the concept should 
be understood as the employment of ICT to enhance the rewards by all parties involved in 
electronic (e)-governance. The parties consist of business entities and citizens as well as 
government units. According to the author, the employment of ICT to improve governance 
embodies the enhancement of, inter alia: respect of institutions within a country; citizenary 
participation and delivery of quality public goods and service.  
 There is an abundant supply of governance definitions in the literature. For the 
purpose of brevity, we follow Asongu (2016) in providing four definitions from recent 
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literature. First, Dixit (2009) has defined economic governance as the  ‘…structure and 
functioning of the legal and social institutions that support economic activity and economic 
transactions by protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, and taking collective action to 
provide physical and organizational infrastructure’3 (p.5). Second, consistent with Fukuyama 
(2013), the notion of governance can be improved with the mastery of some main approaches 
to ‘state quality’, namely: output measures, political indicators and capacity measures which 
consist of resource levels and professionalism. Third, with respect to Tusalem (2015), the 
phenomenon of governance entails: corruption, bureaucratic effectiveness, regulation quality 
and the rule of law. Fourth, Kaufmann et al. (2010) provide six governance measurements 
that are classified in three categories, namely: (i) ‘political governance’ which is the election 
and replacement of political leaders (proxied with political stability/no violence and voice and 
accountability); (ii)  ‘economic governance’, which is defined as the formulation and 
implementation of policies that deliver public commodities (measured with  government 
effectiveness and regulation quality) and (iii) ‘institutional governance’ which is the respect 
of the State and citizens of institutions that govern interactions between them (measured with 
corruption-control and the rule of law).  
 Concerns about the quality of governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. have been 
raised in the literature. Kaufmann and co-authors have been quick to respond to criticisms 
with rebuttals and further clarifications. One of the most heated debates to this end has been 
with Marcus Kurtz and Andrew Schrank. For the purpose of brevity, the interested reader can 
have more insight into the debates in: measures and mechanisms (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007a); a 
reply (Kaufmann et al., 2007a); a defense (Kurtz & Schrank, 2007b) and a rejoinder 
(Kaufmann et al., 2007b).  
 In this study, the governance indicators adopted are those of Kaufmann et al. (2010) 
because they are the most widely employed in the literature (see Gani, 2011; Yerrabit & 
Hawkes, 2015; Andrés et al., 2015). For the purpose of robustness, we bundle the six 
governance measurements into four additional governance composite indicators. The 
motivation for bundling and unbundling governance indicators is consistent with an evolving 
stream of governance literature, notably: in the prediction of the Arab Spring with negative 
governance signals (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a); the importance of economic governance 
in innovation (Oluwatobi et al., 2015) and ongoing debates on institutional determinants of 
investment (Asongu et al., 2016).   
                                                          
3
 Emphasis on original.  
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Data  
 This inquiry assesses 49 countries in SSA with data from World Development 
Indicators (WDI) and World Governance Indicators (WGI) of the World Bank for the period 
2000-2012. Consistent with recent knowledge economy literature (Tchamyou, 2015) and the 
motivation for growth potentials in ICT on the continent discussed in the introduction (see 
also Penard et al., 2012), ICT is measured in terms of  mobile phone and internet penetration 
rates. Globalisation is  approximated by trade (imports plus exports of commodities) and 
financial (foreign direct investment inflows) openness. The rationale for the choice of these 
measurements of globalisation is consistent with  perception in the existing literature that 
trade and financial transactions are intuitively connected with ICT (see Amavilah et al., 2014; 
Asongu, 2014a). A potential weakness of the adopted indicators of trade and financial 
openness lies in the fact that they are skewed in favour of macroeconomic dimensions. Hence, 
other aspects of country-level characteristics such as transparency, political and freedom of 
speech are neglected. A reason for this disregard is that they are broadly captured in the 
governance structure variables.  
 The six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) are used as dependent 
variables. These are bundled in Section 3.2.1 by means of principal component analysis 
(PCA). We have already justified the choice of these variables in the preceding section. They 
include: corruption-control, the rule of law, institutional governance, government 
effectiveness, regulation quality, economic governance, political stability/no violence, ‘voice 
and accountability’, political governance and general governance.  
 Five control variables are adopted in order to control for omission variable bias. After 
a preliminary assessment, including more than five variables in the conditioning information 
set results in instrument proliferation, meaning that the  number of instruments exceeded the 
number of cross section units in every specification. The control variables are: the lagged 
dependent indicator, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth, population growth, educational 
quality and foreign aid.  
Economic growth and population growth have recently been employed by Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2016a) in predicting the Arab Spring based on catch-up in negative governance 
signals. First, we expect GDP growth to be positively associated with good governance 
because high-income countries have comparatively better government standards. Second, 
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population growth can also be positively linked to governance because more resources are 
expected to be devoted to the management and service of a rising population. As a caution to 
this point, it is important to note that population growth may also dampen the government’s 
ability to effectively control the anticipated positive demographic change. Third, the impact of 
foreign aid on governance has been subject to intense debate. Whereas Okada and Samreth 
(2012) have concluded on a positive relationship between foreign aid and institutional quality 
(e.g. corruption) in developing countries, Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b) have used all the 
six governance indicators from Kaufmann et al. (2010) employed in this study to consistently 
establish a negative effect of foreign aid on the underlying government quality dynamics. 
Fourth, the choice of ‘pupil-teacher ratio’ in primary education for educational quality is 
motivated by the evidence that compared to other educational levels, it is more associated 
with higher social returns in nations at initial stages of industrialisation (see Petrakis & 
Stamatakis, 2002;  Asiedu, 2014). The expected effect of education is also debatable. While 
an element of the literature maintains that education worsens governance (Mocan, 2008; 
Truex, 2011; Kaffenberger, 2012), a contending strand is of the position that schooling 
improves governance standards (Lederman et al., 2005; Cheung & Chan, 2008). 
 The definition of variables and corresponding sources are provided in Appendix 1. 
The summary statistics is provided in Appendix 2 whereas Appendix 3 presents the pairwise 
correlation matrix. In the light of information obtained from the summary statistics, two 
points are worth emphasising. On the one hand, the average values of the variables are 
comparable. On the other, based on variations from corresponding standard deviations, we 
can be confident that reasonable estimated linkages would emerge. The objective of the 
correlation matrix is to mitigate concerns about multicollinearity. From a preliminary 
assessment, such concerns are apparent among governance variables for the most part. This 
does not pose any concern about specification bias because the good governance indicators 
are employed exclusively as dependent variables. The degree of substitution between ICT 
variables is also high. We address the concern by employing the ICT regressors in distinct 
specifications.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
 The paper employs the PCA technique to bundle the six governance measurements 
from Kaufmann et al. (2010) into four composite governance measurements, namely: 
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political, economic, institutional and general governances.  The same procedure for bundling 
governance has been recently in employed in Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016a) in recent 
African governance literature. While like in Factor Analysis, PCA is designed for interval 
data, the technique can also be employed for ordinal data (such as Likert scales), when the 
indicators are linearly related to one another. This is precisely the case with governance 
variables which are highly correlated. The PCA is a statistical technique that is used to reduce 
a set of highly correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal 
components (PCs). The derived PCs constitute substantial information and variation in the 
dataset. In this light, the six governance measurements are reduced into one common factor 
known as general governance. Three more indicators are also derived from the six initial 
measurements, namely: institutional governance (encompassing corruption-control and the 
rule of the law); political governance (consisting of voice & accountability and political 
stability) and economic governance (entailing regulation quality and government 
effectiveness). Political governance is the election and replacement of political leaders while 
Economic governance is the formulation and implementation of policies that deliver public 
commodities. Institutional governance is the respect of the State and citizens of institutions 
that govern interactions between them. This procedure for bundling and unbundling 
governance variables by means of PCA is consistent with recent African governance literature 
(Asongu, 2016; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a). 
 The Jolliffe (2002) and Kaiser (1974) criterion is used to retain common factors. In  
principle, only common factors with an eigenvalue that is higher than the mean or one are 
retained as composite indicators. Accordingly, from Table 1, the General governance (G.Gov) 
composite indicator represents more than 81 percent of variation in the six governance 
variables and has an eigenvalue of 4.892. In the same vein, institutional governance (Instgov), 
political governance (Polgov) and economic governance (Ecogov) have total variations 
(eigenvalues) of 93.0 percent, 83.5 percent and 93.9 percent and (1.861, 1.671 and 1.878) 
respectively.  
It is important to allocate space to discussing concerns that may be linked to estimated 
parameters that are obtained from previous estimations. According to Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2016c), the  anxieties are linked to the consistency, efficiency and inferential 
validity of estimated coefficients.  According to Pagan (1984, p. 242), whereas two-step 
estimators are consistent and efficient, very few valid inferences can be obtained. The caution 
of the author is in accordance with a recent stream of literature surrounding the subject, 
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namely: Westerlund and Urbain (2013a); Ba and Ng (2006); McKenzie and McAleer (1997) 
and Oxley and McAleer (1993). 
 
“Insert Table 1 here” 
 
 Within the framework of this inquiry, we are employing PC-augmented variables. 
Building on previous works4, Westerlund and Urbain (2012; 2013b) have provided some 
insights into the limitation relating to the inferential quality of PC-derived indicators. The 
authors built on argument in previous studies  in establishing that normal inferences are 
possible from PC-derived regressors provided that estimated coefficients converge to their 
true values at the rate NT  (with T being the number of time series and N denoting cross-
section observations). The authors have further maintained that for the convergence to take 
place, N and T need to be sufficiently large. Unfortunately, the authors (Westerlund and 
Urbain) have failed to specify how ‘large is large’. Looking at the specific context of this 
study, we are working with all the 49 countries in SSA. Hence, we cannot extend N. 
Stretching T further would compromise the validity of specifications because it is likely to 
result in instrument proliferation. Moreover, recent institutional literature based on PC-
augmented regressors has concluded using comparatively lower values of T and N that valid 
inferences are possible from bundled governance indicators. For instance, Asongu and 
Nwachukwu (2016a) is based on 14 Middle East and North African countries for the period 
1996-2006 while Asongu (2016) is based on BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa) and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey) for the period 2001-2011. The 
authors have made a case for the inferential validity of estimated coefficients.  Compared to 
this inquiry, both studies are based on lower values of N and T. 
 
3.2.2 Estimation technique  
 
 The study adopts a Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation strategy. 
Consistent with Tchamyou and Asongu (2017), there are at least five main motivations for the 
choice of the estimation strategy. The first-two are standard requirements for the adoption of 
the approach whereas the last-three consist of advantages linked to adoption of the empirical 
                                                          
4
 The works include: Stock and Watson (2002); Bai (2003); Pesaran (2006); Bai (2009) and Greenaway-
McGrevy et al. (2012).  
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approach. First, the estimation technique requires that the dependent variables are  stable. As 
apparent in Appendix 4, the governance indicators are persistent because the correlation 
between levels and their corresponding lagged values is higher than the rule of thumb 
threshold of 0.800.  Second, the number of countries (N) is required to be higher that the 
number of years (T). This is the case because the N (49)>T(12) condition is fulfilled. Third, 
the estimation technique accounts for endogeneity by controlling for simultaneity and time-
invariant omitted variables. Fourth, cross-country differences are not eliminated in the 
estimation approach. While country-fixed effects are eliminated in the GMM approach, cross-
country differences are automatically considered in the estimation because the technique is by 
definition linked to panel data framework. Fifth, small sample biases in the difference 
estimator are corrected by the system estimator. It is essentially for this fifth reason that  Bond 
et al. (2001, p. 3-4) have maintained that the system GMM technique (Arellano & Bover, 
1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) is better than the difference GMM approach (Arellano and 
Bond, 1991).  
 This study instead adopts the Roodman (2009ab) extension of Arellano and Bover 
(1995) that employs forward orthogonal deviations instead of first differences. This GMM 
extension has been documented to control for cross-sectional dependence and restrict the 
proliferation of instruments (Love & Zicchino, 2006; Baltagi, 2008).  A two-step specification 
procedure is adopted because it controls for heteroscedasticity. It is important to note that the 
one-step approach is homoscedasticity-consistent.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where tiG ,
 
is a governance indicator (political, economic or institutional governance) of 
country i
 
at  period t ; 0  is a constant;
 
 represents the autoregressive order;  ICT , 
information and communication technology (the mobile phone and internet); Op , openness 
(trade and foreign direct investment);  ICTOp , is the interaction between ICT and openness; 
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W  is the vector of control variables  (GDP growth, population growth, educational quality 
and foreign aid),
 
i
 
is the country-specific effect, t
 
is the time-specific constant  and ti ,  the 
error term. Since the estimation strategy involves interactive regressions, we are consistent 
with Brambor et al. (2006) in including all constituent variables in the specifications.  
 A principal drawback to the GMM approach is the elimination of country-specific 
effects which substantially account for the unobserved heterogeneity. Unfortunately, this 
elimination is necessary to avoid estimation biases. Fortunately, the unobserved heterogeneity 
is also controlled for in the GMM approach using time-invariant omitted variables. Another 
drawback is that estimated coefficients are interpreted as short-term effects because the 
employment of GMM is consistent with data averages for the most part. In this study, we are 
not using data averages.  
 
3.2.3 Identification and exclusion restriction 
 
In line with recent literature (Love &  Zicchino, 2006;  Dewan & Ramaprasad, 2014) all 
independent variables are treated as suspected endogenous or predetermined variables.  
Hence, we adopt the gmmstyle for them. Moreover, only years are treated as exogenous and 
the approach for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ because it is not unfeasible for 
the years to become endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b).  
 The issues about simultaneity are addressed by using lagged regressors as instruments 
for the forward-differenced indicators. Consequently, fixed effects that are likely to affect 
investigated relationships are removed with Helmet transformations that are performed in line 
with Love and Zicchino (2006). Such transformations consist of forward mean-differencing of 
indicators: as opposed to subtracting past observations from present ones (see Roodman, 
2009b, p. 104), the average of future observations is deducted from the variables. The 
transformation enables parallel or orthogonal conditions between forward-differenced 
indicators and lagged values. Regardless of the number of lags, in order to reduce the loss of 
data, the transformations are computed for all observations with the exception of the last for 
each country. “And because lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as 
instruments” (Roodman (2009b, p. 104). 
 In the light of the above, years which are hypothesised to exhibit strict exogeneity 
influence the dependent variable exclusively via endogenous explaining variables. The 
statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is examined with the Difference in Hansen Test 
(DHT) for instrument exogeneity. Accordingly, the null hypothesis of the test should not be 
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rejected for the underlying instruments (or years) to explain the outcome variable exclusively 
through the endogenous explaining variables. The DHT is therefore employed to investigate 
whether years exhibit strict exogeneity, by not explaining governance beyond the engaged 
mechanisms (or endogenous explaining variables). Hence, in the section that follows, the 
reported results should confirm the validity of the exclusion restriction if the null hypotheses 
of DHT corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) are not rejected.  
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
 In accordance with recent empirical literature that is based on the GMM approach 
(Asongu & De Moor, 2017), four principal post-diagnostic information criteria are employed 
to examined the validity of estimation models. First, the absence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals is examined by second order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test in difference 
(AR(2)) whose null hypothesis  for the absence of autocorrelation should not be rejected. 
Second, the null hypothesis of the Sargan (Hansen) over-identification restrictions (OIR) test 
which is not robust (robust) because it is based on homoscedasticity (heteroscedasticity) 
should be rejected for the validity of instruments. Moreover the Sargan (Hansen) is not 
weakened (weakened) by instruments. Concerns about instrument proliferation that can 
substantially compromise the validity of estimated models have been limited by ensuring that 
the rule of thumb requirement for restricting over-identification is met, notably: for each 
specification, the number of instruments is less the corresponding number of countries. 
Furthermore, the validity of the Hansen OIR test is further examined with the Difference in 
Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments. Fourth, a Fisher test that assesses the joint 
validity of estimated coefficients is also disclosed.   
 Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 present findings related to linkages between ‘mobile phones, ICT 
and respectively ‘political governance’, ‘economic governance’, ‘institutional governance’ 
and ‘general governance’. In the light of the study’s motivation, we are more  apprehensive 
about the computation of net effects which are computable when two conditions are fulfilled, 
notably:  the unconditional and conditional effects of ICTs should be significant. The 
conditional or marginal impact is the interaction between ICT and openness. In Table 3 for 
instance, the net effect from the interaction between mobile phones and financial openness (or 
FDI) on government effects is 0.0015 ([-0.00008× 5.332] + 0.002), where: 5.332 is the mean 
value of FDI. 
16 
 
The following findings can be established from Table 2. First, there are no significant 
net effects from the influence of openness in ICT penetration for political governance. 
Second, most of the significant control variables have expected signs.  
We note the following in Table 3 on linkages between ICT, openness and economic 
governance. First, financial openness is more  influential in the positive  relationship between 
ICT and economic governance (government effectiveness and regulation quality) compared to 
trade openness. Second, for significant associations with trade openness, compared to internet 
penetration, the mobile phone is more relevant at improving economic governance when 
combined with trade openness. Third, the control variables are significant with expected 
signs.  
The following findings can be established for Table 4 on linkages between ICT, 
openness and institutional governance. First, net effects are more significant in regressions 
pertaining to financial openness. Second, in the financial openness regressions, interactions 
with mobile phones are more  contributory in stimulating institutional governance, compared 
to those with the internet. In Table 5, only the interaction between internet penetration and 
financial openness significantly boost general governance. The control variables in Tables 4-5 
display expected signs for the most part.  
 
“Insert Tables 2 to 5 here” 
 
4.2 Further discussion of results and implications 
4.2.1 Elucidation of positive net effects  
 We  clarify the positive net effects from both theoretical and practical perspectives. 
First, from a theoretical angle, the findings are consistent with the theoretical underpinnings 
on the relationship between openness and good governance. To be sure Bonaglia et al. (2001) 
established the negative relationship between globalisation and corruption; Klitgaard (1998) 
opined that in situations of monopoly, poor governance is expected to prosper and Treisman 
(2000) reported on the improvement of governance standards in tandem with openness. On 
the practical front, consistent with Snow (2009), four possible rationales elicit the established 
positive net effects, notably; openness could interact with ICT to enhance: access, reach, 
interactions and cost-effectiveness. In summary, the relationship is very likely to be apparent 
because openness complements ICT in mitigating conditions that boost opportunities for bad 
governance, notably reduction of monopoly and information asymmetry.  
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4.2.2 Practical contributions/implications  
 The practical implications are discussed in four principal strands, namely, the: (i) edge 
of financial openness compared to trade openness in stimulating good governance on the one 
hand and the edge of the mobile phone in both ‘trade openness’- and ‘financial openness’-
related estimations, on the other and (ii) consistent absence of significant net effects on 
political governance.  
 First, we have established from the findings that financial openness or financial 
globalisation has an edge over trade openness when combined with ICT to affect both 
economic and institutional governances. Second, mobile phones have an edge over internet 
penetration in complementing (i) trade openness for economic governance and (ii) financial 
openness for institutional governance. The consistent edge of mobile phones over internet 
penetration may be traceable to the narrative of Penard et al. (2012) and Asongu (2017a) on 
the comparatively high penetration of mobile phones over the internet on the continent. 
Hence, it is logical that the propensity at which openness dynamics interact with mobile 
phone penetration is higher than that at which openness interacts with internet penetration to 
affect governance.  
 Third, an interesting finding that merits substantial clarification is the consistent 
insignificant net effects on political governance. While this may be surprising because more 
opened economies are theoretically expected to enjoy higher levels of political governance, in 
reality however, this may not be the case. We explain this unexpected finding with two 
streams of discourse, notably (i) time and level hypotheses of for the benefits of political 
governance from openness and (ii) differences between the Beijing Model (BM) and 
Washington Consensus (WC) in contemporary development paradigms.  
 On the one hand, the insignificant effect of the interaction between openness and ICT 
on political governance may be expected because sampled countries are at early stages of 
industrialisation. Hence, time and level of openness are required to achieve the rewards of 
political governance. It is the case of many developing countries after the adoption of 
openness policies, namely: Turkey (Sayari, 1977) and India (Wade, 1985); Southeast Asia 
(Scott, 1972); Latin America from waves of political openness (Weyland, 1998) and post-
communist countries in the 1990s (Varsee, 1997).  
On the other, from a more contemporary perspective, the insignificant findings of 
political governance can be elucidated by the two dominant models of development.  It is 
important to first of all define the WC and BM. According to Asongu (2016) whereas the WC 
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can be defined as ‘liberalised democracy, private capitalism and priority in political rights’ 
and the BM is defined as ‘de-emphasised democracy, state capitalism and priority in 
economic rights’. According to the description, the WC prioritises political governance 
whereas the BM places more emphasis on economic governance. Asongu and Ssozi (2016) 
have reconciled the BM and the WC by postulating that whereas political governance should 
be a priority in the long term, the BM should be a priority in the short run. This is essentially 
because economic governance delivers economic needs (like food, shelter, health and 
sanitation) while political governance delivers the right to vote (for the most part). The 
reconciliation of the BM and the WC builds on the idea that economic governance should be 
prioritised at the early stages of industrialisation because a middle class is needed to 
sustainably demand political rights in the long-term.  Hence political governance should be a 
long-term priority.  
 In the light of the above, China has achieved her spectacular economic development 
by tailoring openness for economic and institutional governance and stifling political 
governance. In  the post-independence era, China and African countries were almost in the 
same economic turmoil. Unfortunately, while China decided to chart its own development 
course by prioritising economic and institutional governances, most African countries took to 
prescriptions of the Washington consensus which places more emphasis on political 
governance. Today, differences in development between African countries and China are self-
evident. From the established findings, in the short-run, openness-driven ICT policies are 
more rewarding in terms of economic and institutional governance than political governance. 
The short-run inference is based on the perspective that GMM estimates are interpreted as 
short-run effects.  
 
4.2.3 Theoretical contributions/implications   
 There are two main theoretical contributions of this paper to the literature, notably, 
insights into information asymmetry and catch-up in governance. First, as concerns 
information asymmetry, the net positive effects is an indication that ICT reduces information 
asymmetry by consolidating oversight by public officials, civil society and households. This 
inference is consistent with evidence that ICT is positively (negatively) linked to the informal 
(formal) economic sector of African economies (Asongu, 2013) implying that most of civil 
society organisations working from informal social and politico-economic sectors can also 
substantially contribute to improving government quality at the advent of globalisation and 
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ICT. In summary, ICT driven by openness policies enables information sharing which 
mitigates information asymmetry or informational rents that were previously used by the elite 
for corruption and mismanagement. In other words, the interaction between openness and ICT 
contributes to minimising ‘government cost’ and allocating resources more efficiently.  This 
inference accords with the theoretical underpinnings of sharing information for financial 
allocation efficiency in financial institutions (see Claus & Grimes, 2003). It follows from the 
established findings that  foundations for information sharing in the banking industry can be 
extended to government institutions.  
 Second, we have consistently established that past differences in good governance 
have a less proportionate effect on future differences in good governance. This is essentially 
because the absolute value of estimates corresponding to the lagged government variable is 
between zero and one. Hence, the left-hand-side of a system equation is decreasing over time 
because sampled nations with lower levels of governance are catching-up their counterparts of 
higher levels. This economic interpretation is an indication that the catch-up theory can be 
conceived beyond income-convergence (see Asongu, 2014b). Such theoretical contribution is 
supported both by  the literature on the neoclassical growth models (Swan, 1956; Solow, 
1956; Baumol, 1986; Barro, 1991;  Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 1992, 1995; Mankiw et al., 1992; 
Fung, 2009) and  other areas of economic development, notably: inclusive human 
development (Mayer-Foulkes, 2010); financial markets (Bruno et al., 2012; Narayan et al., 
2011); knowledge economy (Asongu, 2017b) and negative government signals in the 
prediction of chaotic events like the 2011  Arab Spring (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a).  
 
5. Conclusion and Future Research Directions 
The purpose of this study has been to investigate how openness influences information and 
communication technology (ICT) penetration for improved government quality in sub-
Saharan Africa for the period 2000-2012. Openness is measured in terms of trade and 
financial globalisation whereas the ICT is proxied with mobile phone and internet penetration 
rates. Ten bundled and unbundled governance indicators are used. The empirical evidence is 
based on Generalised Method of Moments with forward orthogonal deviations. Five main 
findings emerge.  
First, financial openness or financial globalisation has an edge over trade openness 
when combined with ICT to affect both economic and institutional governance. Second, 
mobile phones have an edge over internet penetration in complementing: (i) trade openness 
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for economic governance and (ii) financial openness for institutional governance. Third, net 
effects on political governance are consistently negative.  Hence, in the short-run openness-
driven ICT policies are more influential in terms of higher levels of economic and 
institutional governance than political governance. Fourth, countries with low levels of 
governance are catching-up their counterparts with higher levels of governance. Fifth, only 
the interaction between internet penetration and financial openness significantly boosts 
general governance. Practical and theoretical contributions of the findings to the literature 
have been discussed.  
 Future studies devoted to extending the established findings could engage country-
specific studies for more targeted policy implications. Moreover, assessing openness and ICT 
thresholds at which the established findings are more relevant is also an interesting future 
research direction. The use of estimation techniques that do not eliminate country-specific 
effects and consider other governance variables is worthwhile. Such would require 
governance variables from sources like the International Country Risk Guide that have wider 
time frames to accommodate Fixed Effects regressions.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Principal Component Analysis (PCA) for Composite Governance  
Principal 
Components 
Component Matrix(Loadings) Proportion Cumulative 
Proportion 
Eigen 
Value 
 VA PS RQ GE RL CC    
First PC (G.Gov) 0.395 0.372 0.411 0.426 0.439 0.404 0.815 0.815 4.892 
Second  PC -0.037 0.873 -0.357 -0.303 0.037 -0.124 0.067 0.883 0.407 
Third PC 0.747 -0.035 0.157 -0.131 -0.086 -0.626 0.052 0.935 0.314 
          
First PC (Polgov) 0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.835 0.835 1.671 
Second PC -0.707 0.707 --- --- --- --- 0.164 1.000 0.328 
          
First PC (Ecogov) --- --- 0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.939 0.939 1.878 
Second PC --- --- -0.707 0.707 --- --- 0.060 1.000 0.121 
          
First PC (Instgov) --- --- --- --- 0.707 0.707 0.930 0.930 1.861 
Second PC --- --- --- --- -0.707 0.707 0.069 1.000 0.138 
          
P.C: Principal Component. VA: Voice & Accountability. RL: Rule of Law. R.Q: Regulation Quality. GE: Government Effectiveness. PS: 
Political Stability. CC: Control of Corruption. G.Gov (General Governance): First PC of VA, PS, RQ, GE, RL & CC. Polgov (Political 
Governance): First PC of VA & PS. Ecogov (Economic Governance): First PC of RQ & GE. Instgov (Institutional Governance): First PC of 
RL & CC.  
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Table 2: ICT, Openness and Political governance   
             
             
 Political Stability(PolSta) Voice and Accountability(VA) Political Governance (PolGov) 
 Trade Openness  Financial Openness  Trade Openness  Financial Openness  Trade Openness  Financial Openness  
             
Constant  0.049 0.046 -0.075 0.174* -0.095* -0.011 0.029 -0.151*** 0.063 0.117 0.199** -0.067 
 (0.610) (0.678) (0.492) (0.062) (0.059) (0.876) (0.241) (0.000) (0.549) (0.229) (0.011) (0.541) 
PolSta  (-1) 0.811*** 0.830*** 0.862*** 0.880*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
VA (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.961*** 0.912*** 0.991*** 0.933*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
PolGov (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.958*** 0.951*** 0.959*** 0.980*** 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile 0.002 --- 0.001 --- 0.0009 --- 0.0002 --- 0.001 --- -0.0003 --- 
 (0.252)  (0.179)  (0.271)  (0.414)  (0.590)  (0.719)  
Internet --- -0.005 --- -0.0006 --- 0.009** --- 0..004*** --- -0.005 --- 0.002 
  (0.396)  (0.789)  (0.015)  (0.001)  (0.303)  (0.144) 
Trade  0.0005 0.0006 --- --- -0.0005** -0.0004 --- --- 0.0002 -0.0002 --- --- 
 (0.282) (0.409)   (0.043) (0.379)   (0.657) (0.702)   
FDI --- --- -0.0003 -0.0008 --- --- -0.002*** -0.0003 --- --- -0.004** 0.0007 
   (0.901) (0.488)   (0.004) (0.634)   (0.020) (0.598) 
Mobile.Trade  -0.00001 --- --- --- 0.000001 --- --- --- -0.00001 --- --- --- 
 (0.198)    (0.736)    (0.334)    
Mobile.FDI --- --- -0.00001 --- --- --- 0.00003* --- --- --- 0.00004 --- 
   (0.859)    (0.095)    (0.378)  
Internet.Trade  --- 0.00006 --- --- --- -0.00004 --- --- --- 0.00006 --- --- 
  (0.165)    (0.115)    (0.139)   
Internet.FDI --- --- --- 0.00005 --- --- --- -0.00008 --- --- --- -0.0001** 
    (0.350)    (0.134)    (0.033) 
GDP growth 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.0008 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.003* 0.007*** 0.006** 
 (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.001) (0.187) (0.500) (0.159) (0.105) (0.002) (0.065) (0.001) (0.010) 
Popg  0.032 -0.011 0.079*** 0.052*** -0.001 -0.032*** 0.022* -0.004 -0.007 -0.030* 0.052*** 0.041*** 
 (0.168) (0.556) (0.000) (0.003) (0.886) (0.003) (0.090) (0.500) (0.718) (0.060) (0.000) (0.005) 
Education  -0.007*** -0.003** -0.005*** -0.005*** 0.001* 0.002** -0.0004 0.002*** -0.002 0.001 -0.004*** -0.0007 
 (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.009) (0.086) (0.011) (0.634) (0.007) (0.191) (0.552) (0.001) (0.708) 
Foreign Aid -0.002*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.001*** 0.00005 0.001** -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0005 -0.0005 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.037) (0.000) (0.000) (0.918) (0.024) (0.210) (0.213) (0.694) (0.372) (0.410) (0.155) 
             
Net Effects  na na na na na na na na na na na na 
             
AR(1) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
AR(2) (0.352) (0.362) (0.454) (0.428) (0.959) (0.993) (0.934) (0.894) (0.404) (0.539) (0.386) (0.497) 
Sargan OIR (0.938) (0.788) (0.986) (0.905) (0.040) (0.077) (0.076) (0.068) (0.687) (0.572) (0.924) (0.933) 
Hansen OIR (0.600) (0.461) (0.521) (0.740) (0.153) (0.163) (0.435) (0.429) (0.517) (0.411) (0.702) (0.934) 
             
DHT for 
instruments 
            
(a)Instruments 
in levels 
            
H excluding 
group 
(0.936) (0.959) (0.939) (0.858) (0.183) (0.519) (0.478) (0.540) (0.947) (0.832) (0.919) (0.790) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.298) (0.173) (0.229) (0.515) (0.233) (0.102) (0.390) (0.348) (0.221) (0.201) (0.419) (0.875) 
(b) IV (years, 
eq(diff)) 
            
H excluding 
group 
(0.944) (0.638) (0.825) (0.541) (0.564) (0.146) (0.406) (0.200) (0.691) (0.825) (0.658) (0.833) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.112) (0.239) (0.155) (0.798) (0.040) (0.351) (0.450) (0.822) (0.256) (0.089) (0.569) (0.858) 
             
Fisher  882.26*** 1608.1*** 958.74*** 668.98*** 1151.3*** 1087.1*** 1596.3*** 1037.44 1253.0*** 3406.5*** 1063.4*** 1254.1*** 
Instruments  39 39 39 39 39 39 39  39 39 39 39 
Countries  46 45 46 45 46 45 46  46 45 46 45 
Observations  320 314 322 316 320 314 322  320 314 322 316 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Popg: 
Population growth. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan 
OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.  
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Table 3: ICT, Openness and Economic Governance   
             
             
 Government Effectiveness (GE) Regulation Quality (RQ) Economic Governance (EcoGov) 
 Trade Openness  Financial Openness  Trade Openness  Financial Openness  Trade Openness  Financial Openness  
             
Constant  -0.261*** -0.131** -0.214*** -0.016 -0.226*** -0.203** -0.167*** 0.028 -0.368*** -0.282** -0.203*** 0.094 
 (0.000) (0.042) (0.001) (0.766) (0.003) (0.018) (0.000) (0.554) (0.000) (0.018) (0.003) (0.283) 
GE  (-1) 0.869*** 0.867*** 0.876*** 0.849*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
RQ (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.857*** 0.868*** 0.899*** 0.921*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
EcoGov (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.885*** 0.926*** 0.926*** 0.916*** 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile 0.002*** --- 0.002*** --- 0.003*** --- 0.002*** --- 0.005*** --- 0.003*** --- 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
Internet --- 0.006*** --- 0.004*** --- 0.007** --- -0.002** --- 0.012*** --- 0.001 
  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.046)  (0.015)  (0.003)  (0.611) 
Trade  0.0002 -0.0002 --- --- 0.00006 0.0004 --- --- 0.0004 0.001 --- --- 
 (0.266) (0.380)   (0.784) (0.283)   (0.339) (0.154)   
FDI --- --- 0.002** -0.0007* --- --- 0.003*** -0.002*** --- --- 0.007*** -0.003*** 
   (0.016) (0.057)   (0.005) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile.Trade  -0.000006 --- --- --- -0.00001 
*** 
--- --- --- -0.00001* --- --- --- 
 (0.128)    (0.002)    (0.059)    
Mobile.FDI --- --- -0.00008 
*** 
--- --- --- -0.00007 
*** 
--- --- --- -0.0001 
*** 
--- 
   (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.000)  
Internet.Trade  --- -0.000007 --- --- --- -0.00002 --- --- --- -0.00002 --- --- 
  (0.659)    (0.303)    (0.423)   
Internet.FDI --- --- --- -0.00008 
** 
--- --- --- 0.0006*** --- --- --- 0.0007*** 
    (0.017)    (0.000)    (0.000) 
GDP growth 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002** 0.001 0.003*** 0.0007 0.0002 0.005*** 0.003 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.037) (0.134) (0.009) (0.475) (0.824) (0.002) (0.219) (0.108) (0.436) 
Popg  -0.003 -0.036*** 0.011 -0.016* 0.009 -0.010 0.014* 0.009 0.015 -0.031* 0.042** 0.002 
 (0.804) (0.003) (0.399) (0.085) (0.161) (0.295) (0.053) (0.174) (0.386) (0.092) (0.016) (0.870) 
Education  0.001* 0.002*** 0.0003 -0.0004 0.0003 0.001 0.0008 -0.001* 0.003** 0.005*** 0.002* -0.001 
 (0.056) (0.007) (0.645) (0.609) (0.645) (0.126) (0.207) (0.084) (0.024) (0.001) (0.099) (0.556) 
Foreign Aid -0.00008 0.001*** -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.0002 -0.002** -0.0005 
 (0.856) (0.009) (0.521) (0.733) (0.023) (0.003) (0.019) (0.003) (0.040) (0.829) (0.014) (0.497) 
             
Net Effects  na na 0.0015 0.0035 0.0022 na 0.0016 0.0011 0.0042 na 0.0024 na 
             
AR(1) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
AR(2) (0.209) (0.196) (0.275) (0.260) (0.149) (0.308) (0.106) (0.213) (0.119) (0.097) (0.122) (0.156) 
Sargan OIR (0.356) (0.376) (0.446) (0.295) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.095) (0.142) (0.098) (0.028) 
Hansen OIR (0.478) (0.245) (0.320) (0.549) (0.296) (0.509) (0.349) (0.237) (0.525) (0.280) (0.365) (0.251) 
             
DHT for 
instruments 
            
(a)Instruments 
in levels 
            
H excluding 
group 
(0.350) (0.518) (0.744) (0.772) (0.152) (0.576) (0.115) (0.212) (0.558) (0.518) (0.139) (0.142) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.533) (0.173) (0.163) (0.351) (0.501) (0.416) (0.650) (0.336) (0.446) (0.206) (0.627) (0.444) 
(b) IV (years, 
eq(diff)) 
            
H excluding 
group 
(0.476) (0.277) (0.691) (0.288) (0.290) (0.571) (0.275) (0.456) (0.391) (0.269) (0.307) (0.135) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.428) (0.299) (0.093) (0.846) (0.374) (0.363) (0.503) (0.133) (0.635) (0.377) (0.476) (0.629) 
             
Fisher  1060.5*** 9169*** 4521.9*** 1745.8*** 7630.2*** 936.90*** 6792.1*** 589.26*** 3545.0*** 2987.9*** 3742.7*** 6867.5*** 
Instruments  39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Countries  46 45 46 45 46 45 46 46 46 45 46 45 
Observations  320 314 322 316 320 314 322 316 320 314 322 316 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Popg: 
Population growth. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan 
OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.  
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Table 4: ICT, Openness and Institutional governance   
             
             
 Rule of Law  (RL) Corruption-Control  (CC) Institutional Governance (InstGov) 
 Trade Openness  Financial Openness  Trade Openness  Financial Openness  Trade Openness  Financial Openness  
             
Constant  -0.100* -0.031 -0.106*** 0.030 -0.178*** 0.103* -0.012 -0.034 -0.148 0.169 0.139* 0.165 
 (0.084) (0.603) (0.005) (0.352) (0.009) (0.099) (0.797) (0.570) (0.139) (0.179) (0.072) (0.166) 
RL (-1) 0.900*** 0.932*** 0.888*** 0.965*** --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)         
CC (-1) --- --- --- --- 0.786*** 0.837*** 0.760*** 0.799*** --- --- --- --- 
     (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
InstGov (-1) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.862*** 0.928*** 0.861*** 0.911*** 
         (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile 0.0009 --- 0.001*** --- 0.002*** --- 0.002*** --- 0.004*** --- 0.003*** --- 
 (0.147)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  
Internet --- 0.003 --- -0.0001 --- 0.010** --- 0.003** --- 0.013*** --- 0.004 
  (0.101)  (0.898)  (0.010)  (0.033)  (0.003)  (0.175) 
Trade  0.0001 -0.0003 --- --- -0.0001 -0.001*** --- --- 0.00005 -0.001* --- --- 
 (0.572) (0.174)   (0.582) (0.002)   (0.902) (0.054)   
FDI --- --- 0.002** -0.0005 --- --- -0.0001 -0.001** --- --- 0.002 -0.001 
   (0.023) (0.271)   (0.920) (0.023)   (0.397) (0.123) 
Mobile.Trade  -0.000003 --- --- --- -0.000006 --- --- --- -
0.000009* 
--- --- --- 
 (0.487)    (0.239)    (0.096)    
Mobile.FDI --- --- -0.00006 
*** 
--- --- --- -0.00004* --- --- --- -0.00009 
** 
--- 
   (0.002)    (0.095)    (0.048)  
Internet.Trade  --- -0.00001 --- --- --- -0.00005 --- --- --- -0.00006* --- --- 
  (0.264)    (0.113)    (0.779)   
Internet.FDI --- --- --- 0.00007* --- --- --- -0.00007 --- --- --- 0.00006 
    (0.078)    (0.125)    (0.715) 
GDP growth 0.001** 0.001 0.001 0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0003 -0.002*** -0.002** 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.0006 
 (0.014) (0.207) (0.178) (0.223) (0.634) (0.803) (0.007) (0.011) (0.321) (0.267) (0.378) (0.616) 
Popg  0.010 0.011 0.041*** 0.018*** -0.036** -0.049*** -0.020 -0.040*** -0.033 -0.040* -0.011 -0.033 
 (0.428) (0.122) (0.000) (0.004) (0.019) (0.000) (0.187) (0.006) (0.214) (0.079) (0.545) (0.281) 
Education  -0.0006 -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.0005 -0.0008 -0.001* -0.0005 0.001 -0.0006 -0.002* -0.001 
 (0.464) (0.011) (0.002) (0.000) (0.493) (0.473) (0.053) (0.624) (0.292) (0.779) (0.093) (0.417) 
Foreign Aid -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.001*** -0.0005 0.0003 0.001*** 0.0006* 0.001*** 0.000006 0.001 0.0003 0.0008 
 (0.268) (0.131) (0.008) (0.329) (0.402) (0.009) (0.093) (0.009) (0.993) (0.121) (0.624) (0.196) 
             
Net Effects  na na 0.0006 na na na 0.0017 na 0.0032 0.0083 0.0025 na 
             
AR(1) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
AR(2) (0.210) (0.236) (0.210) (0.217) (0.354) (0.400) (0.366) (0.417) (0.178) (0.210) (0.202) (0.205) 
Sargan OIR (0.017) (0.603) (0.309) (0.673) (0.417) (0.814) (0.333) (0.623) (0.159) (0.778) (0.322) (0.633) 
Hansen OIR (0.429) (0.333) (0.333) (0.292) (0.421) (0.778) (0.350) (0.624) (0.672) (0.759) (0.292) (0.347) 
             
DHT for 
instruments 
            
(a)Instruments 
in levels 
            
H excluding 
group 
(0.140) (0.239) (0.177) (0.119) (0.143) (0.502) (0.464) (0.399) (0.087) (0.233) (0.196) (0.161) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.712) (0.445) (0.520) (0.555) (0.697) (0.794) (0.303) (0.675) (0.978) (0.932) (0.435) (0.565) 
(b) IV (years, 
eq(diff)) 
            
H excluding 
group 
(0.555) (0.200) (0.551) (0.349) (0.525) (0.876) (0.450) (0.452) (0.567) (0.650) (0.572) (0.444) 
Dif(null, 
H=exogenous) 
(0.274) (0.634) (0.170) (0.289) (0.291) (0.386) (0.268) (0.716) (0.638) (0.689) (0.123) (0.270) 
             
Fisher  299.39*** 5593.8*** 857.68*** 2501.2*** 1134.7*** 748.00*** 466.82*** 691.66*** 785.00*** 2012.2*** 959.19*** 3008*** 
Instruments  39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Countries  46 45 46 45 46 45 46 45 46 45 46 45 
Observations  320 312 322 316 320 314 322 316 320 314 322 316 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Popg: 
Population growth. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan 
OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.  
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Table 5: ICT, Openness and General Governance   
     
     
 General Governance  (G.Gov) 
 Trade Openness Financial Openness 
     
Constant  -0.409*** -0.153 -0.204** -0.024 
 (0.002) (0.308) (0.022) (0.833) 
G.Gov (-1) 0.966*** 0.956*** 0.954*** 0.943*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Mobile 0.002 --- 0.003*** --- 
 (0.196)  (0.000)  
Internet --- 0.012** --- 0.006** 
  (0.032)  (0.015) 
Trade  0.0009* -0.0001 --- --- 
 (0.063) (0.894)   
FDI --- --- 0.001 -0.002 
   (0.647) (0.112) 
Mobile.Trade  0.0000004 --- --- --- 
 (0.973)    
Mobile.FDI --- --- -0.00006 --- 
   (0.304)  
Internet.Trade  --- -0.00001 --- --- 
  (0.731)   
Internet.FDI --- --- --- 0.0002** 
    (0.017) 
GDP growth 0.005** 0.005** 0.003 0.003 
 (0.011) (0.022) (0.118) (0.120) 
Popg  0.033 -0.048** 0.065*** 0.005 
 (0.248) (0.010) (0.007) (0.737) 
Education  0.004*** 0.005*** 0.001 0.0007 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.232) (0.695) 
Foreign Aid -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.0009 
 (0.262) (0.304) (0.341) (0.642) 
     
Net Effects  na na na 0.0070 
     
AR(1) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
AR(2) (0.241) (0..245) (0.280) (0.309) 
Sargan OIR (0.096) (0.628) (0.459) (0.630) 
Hansen OIR (0.210) (0.200) (0.394) (0.151) 
     
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group (0.153) (0.366) (0.285) (0.135) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.359) (0.185) (0.483) (0.278) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group (0.531) (0.154) (0.363) (0.100) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.079) (0.433) (0.442) (0.460) 
     
Fisher  3166.34*** 9486.95*** 3478.63*** 8186.55*** 
Instruments  39 39 39 39 
Countries  46 45 46 45 
Observations  320 314 322 316 
     
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Popg: 
Population growth. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying 
Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The 
failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity of the instruments in the Sargan 
OIR test. na: not applicable due to the insignificance of marginal effects.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions (Measurements) Sources 
    
 
Political Stability  
 
PolSta 
“Political stability/no violence (estimate): measured as the 
perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional and violent 
means, including domestic violence and terrorism”  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Voice & 
Accountability  
V&A “Voice and accountability (estimate): measures the extent to 
which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government and to enjoy freedom of expression, freedom 
of association and a free media”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Political 
Governance  
Polgov First Principal Component of Political Stability and Voice & 
Accountability. The process by which those in authority are  
selected and replaced. 
           PCA 
    
 
Government 
Effectiveness 
 
Gov. E 
“Government effectiveness (estimate): measures the quality of 
public services, the quality and degree of independence from 
political pressures of the civil service, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Regulation  
Quality  
RQ “Regulation quality (estimate): measured as the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and 
regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Economic 
Governance  
Ecogov “First Principal Component of Government Effectiveness and 
Regulation Quality. The capacity of government to formulate 
& implement policies, and to deliver services”.  
              PCA 
    
 
Rule of Law  
 
RL 
“Rule of law (estimate): captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the likelihood 
of crime and violence”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
 
Corruption-
Control  
 
CC 
“Control of corruption (estimate): captures perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests”.  
 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Institutional 
Governance  
Instgov First Principal Component of Rule of Law and Corruption-
Control. The respect for citizens and the state of institutions  
that govern the interactions among them 
PCA 
    
General 
Governance  
G.gov First Principal Component of Political, Economic and 
Institutional Governances   
PCA 
    
Mobile phones  Mobile Mobile phone subscriptions (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Internet  Internet  Internet penetration (per 100 people) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade Openness Trade  Imports plus Exports of Commodities (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign 
investment  
FDI Foreign Direct Investment inflows (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
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GDP growth   GDPg Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population growth  Popg Population growth rate (annual %) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Educational 
Quality 
Educ Pupil teacher ratio in Primary Education  World Bank (WDI) 
    
Foreign aid    Aid Total Development Assistance (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  PCA: Principal Component Analysis.  
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2000-2012) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Political Stability -0.543 0.956 -3.323 1.192 578 
Voice & Accountability  -0.646 0.737 -2.233 0.990 578 
Political Governance  0.000 1.292 -3.440 2.583 578 
Government Effectiveness  -0.771 0.620 -2.450 0.934 577 
Regulation Quality  -0.715 0.644 -2.665 0.983 578 
Economic Governance  0.002 1.367 -4.049 3.807 577 
Rule of Law 0.002 1.367 -4.049 3.807 577 
Control of Corruption  -0.642 0.591 -1.924 1.249 579 
Institutional Governance 0.0002 1.364 -3.588 3.766 578 
General Governance 0.004 2.210 -6.308 5.561 577 
Mobile phone penetration  23.379 28.004  0.000 147.202 572 
Internet Penetration  4.152 6.450 0.005 43.605 566 
Trade Openness  78.177 36.138 20.964 209.87 597 
Foreign Direct Investment inflows 5.332 8.737 -6.043 91.007 603 
GDP growth  4.714 6.322 -47.552 63.379 608 
Population growth  2.361 0.948 -1.081 6.576 588 
Educational Quality  43.601 14.529 12.466 100.236 444 
Foreign aid   11.687 14.193 -0.253 181.187 606 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
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Appendix 3: Correlation analysis (uniform sample size: 319) 
                   
Political Governance  Economic Governance  Institutional Governance   ICT Openness Control Variables  
PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov G.gov Internet Mobile Trade FDI GDPg Popg Educ Aid  
1.000 0.678 0.909 0.649 0.574 0.634 0.661 0.802 0.765 0.811 0.377 0.338 0.283 0.009 -0.070 -0.314 -0.366 -0.114 PS 
 1.000 0.922 0.793 0.758 0.803 0.655 0.822 0.771 0.882 0.417 0.366 0.082 -0.046 0.056 -0.314 -0.350 -0.078 VA 
  1.000 0.790 0.731 0.788 0.718 0.887 0.838 0.925 0.434 0.385 0.196 -0.021 -0.004 -0.342 -0.390 -0.104 Polgov 
   1.000 0.868 0.969 0.808 0.888 0.887 0.940 0.449 0.441 0.101 -0.054 0.025 -0.410 -0.292 -0.205 GE 
    1.000 0.963 0.682 0.790 0.770 0.874 0.288 0.394 0.072 -0.078 -0.007 -0.349 -0.294 -0.235 RQ 
     1.000 0.774 0.870 0.860 0.940 0.384 0.433 0.090 -0.068 0.010 -0.394 -0.357 -0.227 Ecogov 
      1.000 0.825 0.956 0.869 0.421 0.399 0.060 -0.062 -0.082 -0.359 -0.421 -0.118 CC 
       1.000 0.954 0.961 0.462 0.403 0.201 -0.039 -0.030 -0.371 -0.406 -0.145 RL 
        1.000 0.957 0.462 0.420 0.135 -0.053 -0.059 -0.381 -0.433 -0.138 Instgov 
         1.000 0.454 0.439 0.147 -0.051 -0.018 -0.398 -0.418 -0.167 G.gov 
          1.000 0.697 0.218 0.060 -0.042 -0.455 -0.497 -0.183 Internet 
           1.000 0.282 0.099 -0.099 -0.404 -0.449 -0.248 Mobile  
            1.000 0.329 -0.020 -0.440 -0.356 -0.086 Trade 
             1.000 0.197 0.065 -0.049 0.209 FDI 
              1.000 0.181 0.139 0.124 GDPg 
               1.000 0.403 0.419 Popg 
                1.000 0.196 Edu 
                 1.000 Aid 
                   
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: 
Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. G.Gov: General Governance. Internet: Internet Penetration. Mobile: Mobile Phone penetration. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment inflows.  GDPg: GDP growth. Popg: 
Population growth. Edu : Educational quality. Aid: Foreign aid.  
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Appendix 4: Persistence of the dependent variables  
           
 Political Governance  Economic Governance  Institutional Governance   
 PS VA Polgov GE RQ Ecogov CC RL Instgov G.gov 
           
PS(-1) 0.965          
VA(-1)  0.982         
Polgov(-1)   0.981        
GE(-1)    0.979       
RQ(-1)     0.981      
Ecogov(-1)      0.986     
CC(-1)       0.967    
RL(-1)        0.985   
Instgov(-1)         0.984  
G.gov(-1)          0.990 
           
PS: Political Stability/Non violence. VA: Voice & Accountability. Polgov: Political Governance. GE: Government Effectiveness. RQ: 
Regulation Quality. Ecogov: Economic Governance. CC: Corruption-Control. RL: Rule of Law. Instgov: Institutional Governance. G.Gov: 
General Governance.  
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